FBI stunned by India's slackness on Headley
NEW DELHI: Home secretary G K Pillai's assertion that US did not share data on Lashkar terrorist David Coleman Headley's links to 26/11 might see some embarrassing questions being posed to Indian authorities over the ease with which the jihadi received visas to travel to India.
While US allowed National Investigation Agency (NIA) representatives lengthy access to Headley, who has pleaded guilty for the 26/11 strike on Mumbai, American authorities harboured a feeling that India was not telling them everything about the terrorist.
For, the FBI and other intelligence agencies of US had wondered as to how Headley could slip in and out of India to Pakistan without the knowledge of its intelligence agencies. US authorities repeatedly asked NIA as to why the sleuths were so slack in tracking Headley.
They were surprised that the Indian mission in Chicago casually gave visa to Headley on a number of occasions without proper verification. And that Headley's travel from Pakistan to India and back on numerous occasions did not trigger an alarm with Indian visa and intelligence authorities.
Headley was actually utilising inputs gathered from India through his reconnaisance visits to brief bosses of Lashkar and ISI during their joint meetings in Pakistan as a part of a pan-Islamic terror agenda.
So, the grievances of Indian officials over US not sharing data might leave their Amereican counterparts dumbstruck. The Indian team was able to piece together an enormous fund of information on 26/11 and Pakistan's role in it through the Headley interviews. Till then, Indians were totally unaware of conspirators other than half a dozen Lashkar figures.
On the basis of shared data, the NIA in its dossier had clearly pointed towards a perception that LeT and ISI were acting independent of the Pakistan government and posing a grave threat to many countries fighting terrorism.
Headley had detailed every meeting he had with his LeT handlers, including Hafeez Saeed and Sajid Mir, and ISI officials at Muzzaffarabad and Lahore prior to the 26/11 attacks.
Headley has pleaded guilty on 12 counts, nine of which relate to the terror attack on Mumbai, to avoid being extradited to India and to escape capital puninishement
While US allowed National Investigation Agency (NIA) representatives lengthy access to Headley, who has pleaded guilty for the 26/11 strike on Mumbai, American authorities harboured a feeling that India was not telling them everything about the terrorist.
For, the FBI and other intelligence agencies of US had wondered as to how Headley could slip in and out of India to Pakistan without the knowledge of its intelligence agencies. US authorities repeatedly asked NIA as to why the sleuths were so slack in tracking Headley.
They were surprised that the Indian mission in Chicago casually gave visa to Headley on a number of occasions without proper verification. And that Headley's travel from Pakistan to India and back on numerous occasions did not trigger an alarm with Indian visa and intelligence authorities.
Headley was actually utilising inputs gathered from India through his reconnaisance visits to brief bosses of Lashkar and ISI during their joint meetings in Pakistan as a part of a pan-Islamic terror agenda.
So, the grievances of Indian officials over US not sharing data might leave their Amereican counterparts dumbstruck. The Indian team was able to piece together an enormous fund of information on 26/11 and Pakistan's role in it through the Headley interviews. Till then, Indians were totally unaware of conspirators other than half a dozen Lashkar figures.
On the basis of shared data, the NIA in its dossier had clearly pointed towards a perception that LeT and ISI were acting independent of the Pakistan government and posing a grave threat to many countries fighting terrorism.
Headley had detailed every meeting he had with his LeT handlers, including Hafeez Saeed and Sajid Mir, and ISI officials at Muzzaffarabad and Lahore prior to the 26/11 attacks.
Headley has pleaded guilty on 12 counts, nine of which relate to the terror attack on Mumbai, to avoid being extradited to India and to escape capital puninishement
DEEPAK KUMAR
PGDM
1 SEM
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